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Abstract
Empirical evaluation of policies to mitigate climate change has been largely
conﬁned to the application of discounted utilitarianism (DU). DU is contro-
versial, both due to the conditions through which it is justiﬁed and due to its
consequences for climate policies, where the discounting of future utility gains
from present abatement eﬀorts makes it harder for such measures to justify
their present costs. In this paper, we propose sustainable discounted utilitari-
anism (SDU) as an alternative principle for evaluation of climate policy. Unlike
undiscounted utilitarianism, which always assigns zero relative weight to present
utility, SDU is an axiomatically based criterion, which departs from DU by as-
signing zero weight to present utility if and only if it exceeds future welfare.
Using the DICE integrated assessment model to run risk analysis, we show that
it is possible for future welfare to be below present utility along a `business
as usual' development path. Consequently SDU and DU diﬀer, and willing-
ness to pay for emissions reductions is (sometimes signiﬁcantly) higher under
SDU than under DU. Under SDU, stringent schedules of emissions reductions
increase social welfare, even if the discount rate is relatively high.
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1 Introduction
Empirical evaluation of policies to mitigate climate change has been largely conﬁned
to the application of discounted utilitarianism (DU). DU means that one stream of
consumption is deemed better than another if and only if it generates a higher sum
of utilities discounted by a constant per period discount factor δ, where δ is positive
and smaller than one.
In spite of its prevalence, DU is controversial, both due to the conditions through
which it is justiﬁed and due to its consequences for choice in economically relevant
situations, such as climate-change policy. As a matter of principle, DU gives less
weight to the utility of future generations and therefore treats generations in an
unequal manner. If one abstracts from the probability that the world will be coming
to an end, thereby assuming that any generation will appear with certainty, it is
natural to question whether it is fair to value the utility of future generations less
than that of the present one. This criticism has a long tradition dating back at
least as far as Ramsey (1928, p. 543), who argued that the practice of discounting
later enjoyments in comparison with earlier ones is ethically indefensible and arises
merely from the weakness of the imagination.
When applied to evaluating climate policies, DU means that the future utility
gains of present abatement eﬀorts are discounted, which makes it harder for such
measures to justify their present costs. This was one of the earliest ﬁndings in the
economic literature on climate change (cf. Cline, 1992; Nordhaus, 1991).
One way of treating generations equally is to evaluate policies according to undis-
counted utilitarianism, whereby future utilities are summed without being discoun-
ted. This alternative was highlighted during the debate following the publication
of the Stern Review (2007), which, while committed to DU, applied a utility dis-
count rate of very nearly zero. However, such a criterion (or DU with a near-zero
utility discount rate) may contradict our ethical intuitions if used to evaluate all
investments, as it is most likely to impose heavy sacriﬁces on the present generation
for the beneﬁt of future generations that are likely to be much better oﬀ (Arrow,
1999; Dasgupta, 2007; Mirrlees, 1967; Rawls, 1971). The reason for this weakness of
undiscounted utilitarianism is that it assigns zero relative weight to present utility
under all circumstances, i.e. even when the present is worse oﬀ than the future.
Sustainable discounted utilitarianism (SDU), proposed by Asheim and Mitra
(2010), avoids the pitfalls of DU (which is too willing to sacriﬁce future genera-
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tions) and undiscounted utilitarianism (which is too willing to sacriﬁce the present
generation).
SDU departs from DU by placing the additional constraint on social welfare
evaluation that no weight be given to present utility if it exceeds future welfare. For
example, if the future consequences of climate change entail that present wellbeing
exceeds that of the future, then SDU takes into account the future beneﬁts of present
mitigation eﬀorts, while ignoring their current costs. Therefore, if there is a non-
negligible probability that climate change will undermine future wellbeing, then SDU
promotes present action more than DU. However, SDU coincides with DU if the
future will for sure be better oﬀ than the present in spite of climate change.
If the future will be better oﬀ than the present, then additional present sacri-
ﬁce for the beneﬁt of the future may increase the undiscounted sum of present and
future utilities. It also increases the verge between present and future wellbeing,
thus making the intergenerational distribution more unequal. Therefore, it seems
uncontroversial to allow a trade-oﬀ between present and future wellbeing in such
circumstances. However, if the future will be worse oﬀ than the present, then addi-
tional present sacriﬁce leading to a uniform increase of future wellbeing increases the
undiscounted sum of present and future utilities and decreases inequality. Hence,
such a transfer from the present to the future is desirable both from a utilitarian
and egalitarian perspective. This is the ethical underpinning for a condition called
Hammond Equity for the Future, which gives priority to the future in conﬂicts
where the future is worse oﬀ than the present.
Hammond Equity for the Future is the key condition in the axiomatic basis for
SDU, as investigated by Asheim et al. (2010). SDU also satisﬁes Chichilnisky's (1996)
No Dictatorship of the Present. In contrast, DU is in conﬂict both with Hammond
Equity for the Future, as it allows a trade-oﬀ between present and future wellbeing
even when the present is better oﬀ than the future, and No Dictatorship of the
Present, as the ranking of DU (on the set of bounded streams) does not depend on
what happens beyond some ﬁnite future point in time.
Compared to DU, imposing Hammond Equity for the Future comes at the cost
of (i) removing sensitivity to the interests of the present if the present is better oﬀ
than the future and (ii) relaxing to the set of non-decreasing streams the property
that the trade-oﬀ between wellbeing in the ﬁrst two periods be separable from the
remainder of the stream. Regarding (i), there is a large literature, starting with
Diamond (1965), which has established a conﬂict between imposing equity conditions
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(like equal treatment and Hammond Equity for the Future) on the one hand, and
remaining sensitive to the interests of every generation on the other. Asheim et
al. (2010, Section 4) present a formal analysis showing how imposing on the set of
all streams the separability property of DU mentioned under (ii) is in conﬂict with
equity conditions that respect the interests of future generations.
The present paper proposes SDU as an alternative criterion to DU for the evalu-
ation of climate abatement policies, and it seeks to illustrate that substituting SDU
for DU matters for empirical evaluation of such policies. We do so by considering
the DICE integrated assessment model, built by William Nordhaus, but where we
run risk analysis, including alternative speciﬁcations for the important parameters
determining the climate sensitivity and damage function. Weitzman (2009, 2010a,b)
in particular has raised doubt concerning the climate sensitivity and damage func-
tion used in the standard DICE model. Our alternative speciﬁcations lead to a
non-negligible probability that some generation is better oﬀ than its descendants, in
which case adopting SDU instead of DU matters for the evaluation, so much so that
we are able to show aggressive emissions abatement increases social welfare under
SDU, even when the utility discount rate is relatively high. By contrast, we conﬁrm
that such abatement policies fail to increase social welfare under DU. We also show
that the optimal abatement policy is more stringent under SDU than DU.
Our analysis is ethical in nature, asking what our generation as a collective should
do to serve the interests of all generations from an impartial perspective. This is
diﬀerent from taking a strategic perspective, asking what contemporary countries or
individuals should do to serve their own interests when such actions inﬂuence the
future strategic actions of other countries and individuals. Nevertheless, since SDU
bridges the gap between DU and undiscounted utilitarianism, we believe it is realistic
to suggest that our generation should take its recommendations into account.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present formally the concept
of SDU. While Asheim and Mitra (2010) have already done so in a deterministic
setting and without explicit consideration of population growth, empirical evaluation
of climate policies does not permit either of these simpliﬁcations, so Section 2 extends
SDU to variable population and uncertainty. In Section 3 we present risk analysis
with DICE, discussing in particular our choice of climate sensitivity and damage
function, before in Section 4 reporting the results from our analysis. As we discuss
in the concluding Section 5, the present paper should be considered a ﬁrst eﬀort
in combining recent advances in axiomatic theories of intertemporal social choice
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(for a survey, see Asheim, 2010) with empirical evaluation of climate-change policies.
Nevertheless, we claim that our analysis is strongly indicative of the importance of
broadening the basis of climate-policy evaluation from DU to SDU and beyond.
2 What is Sustainable Discounted Utilitarianism?
In the empirical part of this paper we consider only consumption streams which
eventually become constant.1 This setting simpliﬁes the presentation of SDU, and
we refer the reader to Asheim and Mitra (2010) for the more general treatment.
Let ct > 0 denote consumption in period t, and let 0c = (c0, . . . , ct, . . . ) be an
inﬁnite stream of consumption, where there exists T ≥ 0 such that ct = cT for all
t ≥ T . A consumption stream 0c is called egalitarian if ct = c0 for all t ≥ 0.
Utility in a period is derived from consumption in that period alone. The utility
function U is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuous and
continuously diﬀerentiable for c > 0 with U ′(c) → ∞ as c → 0. Clearly, any utility
function with constant relative inequality aversion satisﬁes these assumptions.
Let δ ∈ (0, 1) denote the utility discount factor, and let ρ > 0 denote the utility
discount rate, where the relation between δ and ρ is given by
δ =
1
1 + ρ
. (1)
The theoretical presentation of SDU in this section is facilitated by using the utility
discount factor δ, while the numerical results in Section 4 are easier to interpret in
terms of the utility discount rate ρ. Keeping in mind eq. (1), this should not create
confusion.
In the axiomatic analysis of Asheim and Mitra (2010), time periods correspond
to non-overlapping generations assumed to follow each other in sequence. In the
empirical analysis of this paper, time periods are shorter, set to ten years (given
by the time-step of the DICE model). As long as the discount factor is properly
adjusted to reﬂect a plausible trade-oﬀ between present utility and future welfare
(straightforward when it is a function of the utility discount rate as above), this
choice of period-length does not matter. With overlapping generations, discounting
from an ethical perspective between diﬀerent generations should be diﬀerentiated
1We use a modelling horizon from 2005 to 2395 and assume that consumption remains at the
2395 level thereafter.
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from the self-interested discounting that people do within their own lifetimes, and
our analysis does reﬂect the need to do such diﬀerentiation.
Given any δ ∈ (0, 1), the social welfare function (SWF) w deﬁned by
w(0c) = (1− δ)
∑∞
t=0
δtU(ct) (2)
is the discounted utilitarian (DU) SWF. Multiplying by 1− δ ensures that the utility
weights
(
1− δ, (1− δ)δ, (1− δ)δ2, . . . , (1− δ)δt, . . . ) sum up to one. Such a normal-
isation is useful, as it makes the utility of each generation comparable to the welfare
of the stream. The DU SWF is well-deﬁned for the set of consumption streams which
eventually becomes constant. Furthermore, on this set, it is characterized by
w(0c) = (1− δ)U(c0) + δw(1c) (w.1)
w(0c) = U(c0) if 0c is egalitarian . (w.2)
Clearly, (2) implies (w.1) and (w.2). Conversely, for any 0c = (c0, . . . , ct, . . . ) with
ct = cT for all t ≥ T , it follows from (w.2) that
w(T c) = U(cT ) = (1− δ)
∑∞
t=T
δt−TU(ct) .
Repeated use of (w.1) now yields (2).
The sustainable discounted utilitarian (SDU) SWF modiﬁes DU by requiring that
an SDU SWF not be sensitive to the interests of the present generation if the present
is better oﬀ than the future:
W (0c) =
 (1− δ)U(c0) + δW (1c) if U(c0) ≤W (1c)W (1c) if U(c0) > W (1c) , (W.1)
W (0c) = U(c0) if 0c is egalitarian . (W.2)
Condition (W.1) means that future utilities are not discounted (the discount factor is
set to 1) if the present is better oﬀ than the future. For any 0c = (c0, . . . , ct, . . . ) with
ct = cT for all t ≥ T , it follows from (W.2) that W (T c) = U(cT ). Repeated use of
(W.1) now allows us to recursively calculate W (T−1c), W (T−2c), and so on, ending
up with W (0c): Given that W (T c), W (T−1c), . . . , W (tc) have been determined,
where 1 ≤ t ≤ T , the next step in the recursion, W (t−1c), is determined by
W (t−1c) =
 (1− δ)U(ct−1) + δW (tc) if U(ct−1) ≤W (tc)W (tc) if U(ct−1) > W (tc) .
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This explicit algorithm for calculatingW (0c) is the one used in the empirical analysis.
Hence, on our domain of eventually constant consumption streams, the SDU SWF
is uniquely determined.
The following result establishes that SDU welfare is a non-decreasing function
of time. Furthermore, SDU welfare is bounded above by DU welfare, with the two
welfare measures coinciding if the consumption stream is non-decreasing.
Proposition 1 Assume that 0c is eventually constant.
(i) For all t ≥ 0, W (0c) ≤W (tc) ≤ w(tc)
(ii) If 0c is non-decreasing, then W (0c) = w(0c).
Proof. This is a special case of Asheim and Mitra (2010, Proposition 2).
Part (ii) means SDU welfare diﬀers from DU welfare only if the consumption stream
is not non-decreasing. Hence, existence of some t ≥ 0 such that ct > ct+1 is a
necessary, but insuﬃcient, condition for SDU welfare being strictly below DU welfare,
and emphasis will be placed on this possibility in the empirical analysis.
The stationary equivalent consumption c¯ of a consumption stream 0c is the con-
sumption level c¯, which if held constant yields the same welfare as the consumption
stream 0c. By (w.2), the stationary equivalent consumption c¯ of a consumption
stream 0c under DU satisﬁes U(c¯) = w(0c), or since U is strictly increasing:
c¯ = U−1
(
w(0c)
)
.
By (W.2), the stationary equivalent consumption c¯ of a consumption stream 0c under
SDU satisﬁes U(c¯) = W (0c), or since U is strictly increasing:
c¯ = U−1
(
W (0c)
)
.
We use the stationary equivalent consumption to express non-marginal welfare dif-
ferences in consumption terms (more on this in Section 4).
2.1 Variable population and uncertainty
Asheim and Mitra (2010) introduce SDU in a deterministic setting where population
growth is not explicitly discussed. Application of SDU to climate change, and indeed
to a number of other policy issues, requires explicit treatment of population growth
and uncertainty, however, and we turn to these issues now.
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In Asheim and Mitra (2010, p. 150), consumption in period t is interpreted as a
non-negative indicator of the wellbeing of generation t. However, how do we compare
the wellbeing of the present generation with the wellbeing of future generations if
population size changes over time?
One possibility is to represent the wellbeing of each generation by the product
of population size and the utility derived from per-capita consumption. This is the
position of `classical utilitarianism'. An alternative position is to let the wellbeing
of each generation depend only on per-capita consumption; this is called `average
utilitarianism'. It turns out that applying the condition which provides an axiomatic
support for SDU  Hammond Equity for the Future  at the level of individuals
yields an argument in favour of `average utilitarianism'.
At the level of individuals, Hammond Equity for the Future is concerned with a
situation where all present individuals are equally well oﬀ and all future individuals
are equally well oﬀ, but where the wellbeing of each present individual exceeds that of
each future individual. In this situation, Hammond Equity for the Future, combined
with conditions ensuring representation by means of a SWF, entails that no weight
be given to a uniform gain for present individuals. Hence, the comparison is between
present and future individual wellbeing. Under the assumption that consumption is
a comprehensive measure capturing all sources of human wellbeing, this corresponds
to a comparison between present and future per-capita consumption, in line with the
position of average utilitarianism.
As mentioned in the introduction and further explored by Asheim et al. (2010,
Section 3), the appeal of Hammond Equity for the Future is that it can be endorsed
both from a utilitarian and egalitarian point of view. The utilitarian support rests
on there being an inﬁnite number of future individuals. As long as there is an inﬁnite
number of generations, each with a positive number of individuals, this is satisﬁed
independently of how population size develops over time. The egalitarian support for
the worse-oﬀ future individuals in comparison with the better-oﬀ present individuals
does not depend on their numbers, only their individual wellbeing.2
On this basis, we apply average SDU in our empirical analysis, and, for compar-
ison, we also apply average DU. At the same time, however, we should acknowledge
the substantial literature taking the opposite stance (see, e.g. Meade, 1955; Mir-
2The position of average utilitarianism is also supported in Asheim and Bossert's (2011) ax-
iomatic analysis of sustainability in the case where population is endogenous, so that each popula-
tion can control (or at least, inﬂuence) the size of the population in the next period.
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rlees, 1967; Dasgupta, 2001; Blackorby et al., 2005), and the extension of SDU, ﬁrst
in terms of its axiomatic foundations and then in application, to cases of variable
population would be a valuable future research project.
Now we turn to the analysis of uncertainty. We make the simplifying assumption
that the utility function U not only expresses aversion to inequality over time, but
also aversion to risk. It is of interest to separate inequality aversion from risk aversion,
but this is outside the scope of the present paper. In any case, the identity between
aversion to inequality over time and to risk is standard in the empirical literature on
climate-policy evaluation, so our results will be easier to compare to previous studies
in this way.
Assume that there is a probability distribution over consumption streams.3 By
writing V (u,w) := min{(1 − δ)u + δw,w}, it follows from (W.1) that W (0c) =
V (U(c0),W (1c)). Since V is a concave function of u and w, it follows from Jensen's
inequality that
E(V (U(c˜0),W (1c˜))) ≤ V (E(U(c˜0)), E(W (1c˜))) ,
with strict inequality if both U(c0) < W (1c) and U(c0) > W (1c) are assigned positive
probability. This means that dynamic programming methods cannot be used for
calculating the expected value of SDU welfare. However, calculating SDU welfare
for each realization and then taking expectations yields a correct result. This is what
we do in the empirical analysis.
3 Risk analysis with DICE
In order to examine empirically the diﬀerences between climate policy evaluation
under SDU and DU, we employ the DICE integrated assessment model of the joint
climate-economy system, built by William Nordhaus (we adapt the 2007 version of
the model, described in Nordhaus, 2008). In brief, DICE couples a standard Ramsey-
Cass-Koopmans model of economic growth to a simple model of the climate system.4
3In the empirical part this corresponds to the empirical distribution of 1000 random draws of a
Latin Hypercube sample.
4IPCC (Houghton et al., 1997) coined the term `simple climate model' to denote models, which
specify the atmosphere, surface and deep oceans as one-dimensional, uniformly mixed boxes, which
exchange heat and/or CO2 with each other. By contrast, atmosphere-ocean general circulation
models (AOGCMs), the most complex type of climate model, divide the atmosphere and ocean into
a detailed three-dimensional grid, with many longitudinal, latitudinal and vertical points.
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Output of a composite good is produced using aggregate capital and labour inputs,
augmented by exogenous total factor productivity in a Cobb-Douglas production
function. However, industrial production is also associated with the emission of
carbon dioxide, which is an input to the simple climate model,5 resulting in radiative
forcing of the atmosphere and an increase in global mean temperature. The climate
model couples back to the economy by means of a so-called `damage function', which
is a reduced-form polynomial equation associating a change in temperature with a
loss in utility, expressed in terms of equivalent output. The damage function in DICE
implicitly takes account of the economy and society's capacity to adapt to climate
change, which reduces the amount of output lost for a given increase in global mean
temperature, so that the representative agent is left to choose how much to invest in
abating CO2 emissions from production versus how much to invest in the composite
capital good for future consumption. The model is globally aggregated and is resolved
in decadal time steps from 2005 up to 2395.
DICE is described in full in Nordhaus (2008), and for the sake of brevity we focus
our exposition here on those parts of the model we have modiﬁed. Since uncertainty
is central to climate policy, we select a subset of eight of the most important pa-
rameters in DICE, and specify each as random. Table 1 lists these parameters and
the form and parameterisation of their probability distribution. In selecting these
eight parameters, we have followed the lead of Nordhaus' (2008) own risk analysis.
However, in the case of two parameters, we have chosen an alternative speciﬁca-
tion. They describe the climate sensitivity and the curvature of the damage function
respectively, and we devote special attention to them below.
The ﬁrst four parameters in Table 1 play a role in determining CO2 emissions.
Of these four parameters, Kelly and Kolstad (2001) showed that growth in total
factor productivity and in population are particularly important. The reason is
that, in integrated assessment models such as DICE, growth in CO2 emissions is
proportional to growth in global economic output, which in turn is determined in
signiﬁcant measure by productivity growth and by the stock of labour. In addition,
where a classical utilitarian SWF is applied, the larger (smaller) is the population
when the impacts of climate change occur, the higher (lower) is the social valuation
of climate damage (although, as above, this is not a consideration for us). However,
while CO2 emissions are proportional to output, the proportion is usually assumed
to decrease over time due to changes in economic structure away from CO2-intensive
5Alongside exogenous emissions of carbon dioxide from land use.
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Table 1. Uncertain parameters for simulation of modiﬁed DICE-2007.
Parameter Units Functional Mean Standard Source
form deviation
Initial growth Per Normal 0.0092 0.004 Nordhaus
rate of TFP year (2008)
Asymptotic Millions Normal 8600 1892 Nordhaus
global population (2008)
Rate of Per Normal -0.007 0.002 Nordhaus
decarbonisation year (2008)
Total resources Billion tons Normal 6000 1200 Nordhaus
of fossil fuels of carbon (2008)
Price of back- US$ per ton of Normal 1170 468 Nordhaus
stop technology carbon replaced (2008)
Transfer coeﬃcient Per Normal 0.189 0.017 Nordhaus
in carbon cycle decade (2008)
Climate ◦C per doubling of Log- 1.099* 0.3912* Weitzman
sensitivity atmospheric CO2 normal (2009)
Damage function Fraction of Normal 0.082 0.028 Own
coeﬃcient α3 global output estimate
*In natural logarithm space.
production activities, and to increases in the eﬃciency of output with respect to
CO2 emissions in a given activity. In DICE, this is achieved by virtue of a variable
representing the ratio of emissions/output, which decreases over time as a function
of a rate-of-decarbonisation parameter. A further check on industrial CO2 emissions
is provided in the long run by the ﬁnite total remaining stock of fossil fuels, which
is also treated here as an uncertain parameter.
The ﬁfth uncertain parameter in Table 1 is the price of a so-called `backstop' tech-
nology, which in the context of climate-change mitigation is the price of a technology
that is capable of completely nullifying CO2 emissions. In DICE, the backstop is
deployed if the control rate on CO2 emissions reaches 100%, so it is conceptually the
marginal cost of the last unit of emissions abatement. Such a technology could most
plausibly be a zero-emissions energy technology such as solar or geothermal power.6
6It could also be a geo-engineering technology such as artiﬁcial trees to sequester atmospheric
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The backstop price starts very high (mean = US$1170/tC), but declines over time.
Hence it becomes an important determinant of the cost of abatement in the long
run.
The sixth and seventh parameters in Table 1 capture important uncertainties in
climate science. At a very high level of abstraction, one can distinguish between (i)
uncertainties in climate modelling that derive from the cycling of carbon between its
various 'sinks' (the atmosphere, the hydrosphere, the biosphere and the lithosphere),
which therefore render forecasts of the atmospheric stock of CO2 for a given pulse of
emissions uncertain, and (ii) uncertainties in the relationship between a rising stock
of atmospheric CO2 and temperature. In DICE, the carbon cycle is represented by
a system of equations, each containing several parameters. Here, uncertainty about
the carbon cycle is captured in a tractable way by focussing on a parameter that
determines the proportion of CO2 in the atmosphere in a particular time period,
which dissolves into the upper ocean in the next period.
3.1 Climate sensitivity
Uncertainty about the relationship between atmospheric CO2 and temperature is
captured by a random climate-sensitivity parameter. The climate sensitivity is the
increase in global mean temperature, in equilibrium, that results from a doubling in
the atmospheric stock of CO2. In simple climate models, it is critical in determining
how fast and how far the planet is forecast to warm in response to emissions. The
IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report compiled a number of recent estimates of the
climate sensitivity (IPCC, 2007). It concluded that the best estimate of the climate
sensitivity is 3◦C, that there is a greater than 66% chance of it falling in the range 2
4.5◦C (the IPCC's likely range), and a less than 10% chance of it being lower than
1.5◦C (very unlikely). This leaves around a 17% chance that the climate sensitivity
exceeds 4.5◦C, and indeed a critical feature of all 18 probability density functions
of the climate sensitivity compiled by IPCC is that they have a positive skew, with
a long tail of high estimates. These tails can be attributed to uncertainty about
feedbacks (Roe and Baker, 2007), related for example to clouds and water vapour,
and about the cooling eﬀect of aerosols.
In Nordhaus' (2008) risk analysis with DICE, the random climate-sensitivity
parameter is normally distributed with a mean of 3◦C and a standard deviation of
CO2, except that DICE has exogenous emissions of CO2 from land use.
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1.1◦C. Compared with the evidence compiled by IPCC, however, this distribution
may signiﬁcantly underestimate the probability of very high values. For example, a
value of 6.3◦C, which is three standard deviations from the mean of Nordhaus' normal
distribution, is assigned a probability of only around 0.1%, whereas several of the pdfs
in IPCC (2007) put the corresponding probability at 510%. Similarly, in his review
of the evidence, Weitzman (2009) considers that there is a 1% chance of the climate
sensitivity exceeding 10◦C. According to the above normal distribution, this is less
likely than a `six sigma' event, so it has a probability of less than 10−7%. Therefore we
specify the random climate-sensitivity parameter as lognormally distributed. With
the parameterisation in Table 1, it can easily be veriﬁed that a value of at least
6.3◦C, for example, is associated with a 3% probability.
3.2 The damage function
The ﬁnal parameter in Table 1 is one element of the damage function linking tempera-
ture and output-equivalent losses in utility. In recent years, there has been increasing
focus in climate-change economics on this critical function (e.g. Weitzman, 2010a),
which is unsurprising when one considers that, without the damage function, the
accumulation of atmospheric CO2 has no consequence for social welfare. In many
past studies, including those with DICE, the approach has been to specify losses in
utility as a quadratic function of global mean temperature:
Ω(T ) =
1
1 + α1Tt + α2T 2t
, (3)
where Ω, to keep our nomenclature consistent with Nordhaus (2008), is the propor-
tion of output lost at time t, T is the increase in global mean temperature over the
pre-industrial level, and α1 and α2 are coeﬃcients.
The coeﬃcients α1 and α2 are calibrated on the large literature devoted to es-
timating the cost of climate change in particular sectors of the economy, such as
agriculture, energy, and health (summarised in Parry et al., 2007). This literature
provides estimates of varying reliability and validity, but it can generally be concluded
that the loss in utility for warming of up to about 3◦C is relatively well constrained,
and is equivalent to a few percent of output. Unfortunately, what the impacts of
climate change will be for larger amounts of global warming remains largely in the
realm of guesswork (Weitzman, 2009), due to possible non-linearities in the biophys-
ical and socio-economic response to changes in climate variables, as well as possible
singularities in the climate system itself (e.g. a collapse in the Antarctic ice sheet,
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or a shutdown in the ocean circulation), all of which are very poorly understood at
present. This points the spotlight at the functional form for damages.
There has never been any stronger justiﬁcation for the assumption of quadratic
damages than the general supposition of a non-linear relationship, added to the fact
that quadratic functions are of a familiar form to economists, with a tractable linear
ﬁrst derivative (i.e. the marginal beneﬁt function of emissions reductions). However,
when extrapolated to large temperature levels, the implications of a quadratic func-
tion have recently been cast in doubt. Both Ackerman et al. (2010) and Weitzman
(2010b) have shown that, with Nordhaus' (2008) calibration of equation (3), 5◦C
warming results in a loss of utility equivalent to just 6% of output, despite such
warming being equivalent to the diﬀerence between the present global mean temper-
ature and the temperature at the peak of the last ice age, while it takes around 18◦C
of warming for losses in utility to exceed the equivalent of 50% of output.
There are various ways to remedy what is increasingly regarded as an implausible
forecast. Following equation (3), utility losses can be ramped up by increasing the
coeﬃcients α1 and α2, but only at the expense of unrealistically large losses in utility
for the initial 3◦C warming. Conceptually, much follows from the speciﬁcation of the
utility function. Working with a standard utility function whose sole argument is
consumption of the composite good, we can introduce a higher-order term into the
damage function to capture greater non-linearity, as Weitzman (2010b) does.7 We
specify the following function:
Ω(T ) =
1
1 + α1Tt + α2T 2t + α˜3T
7
t
, (4)
where α˜3 is a normally distributed random coeﬃcient with mean and standard devi-
ation reported in Table 1. The remaining coeﬃcients α1 and α2 are as in Nordhaus
(2008). If α˜3 takes its mean value, 5
◦C warming results in a loss of utility equiva-
lent to around 7% of output, while 50% of output is not lost until the global mean
temperature is roughly 11◦C above the pre-industrial level. Thus the mean value of
function (4) remains fairly conservative at high temperatures. However, when α˜3 is
three standard deviations larger than the mean, 5◦C warming triggers an output loss
of around 25% of output, and 50% of output is lost when warming reaches just 6◦C.
This is very close to the speciﬁcation of Weitzman (2010b). Conversely, at three
standard deviations below the mean, α˜3 is small enough that function (4) virtually
7The alternative is to specify utility as a function not only of consumption but also of environ-
mental quality directly, for example indexed by global mean warming.
13
collapses to function (3), so our risk analysis on the damage function can be said
to span the approaches taken by Nordhaus on the one hand and Weitzman on the
other.
4 Results
As reported in Section 2, a necessary, but insuﬃcient, condition for SDU welfare to
be below DU welfare is that there exists some period t ≥ 0 such that ct > ct+1.
This period t has to be smaller than the model's terminal period T , as we impose
constant consumption beyond T . Satisfying this condition will in general depend on
severe climate-change damage, since the DICE model, in line with other integrated
assessment models, predicts strong growth in production in the absence of such
damage. For example, when all the coeﬃcients αi of the damage function are set
to zero, so that damages are `switched oﬀ', global mean consumption per capita in
DICE is forecast to grow in real terms from US$6,667 in 2005, the base year, to
US$26,159 in 2105, and onwards to over US$80,000 in 2205.8 Hence the probability
that ct > ct+1 for 0 ≤ t < T may be low, but as long as it is not zero, SDU may lead
to a diﬀerent evaluation of policies to cut CO2 emissions than will DU. Therefore we
begin our analysis of the modelling results by investigating the probability that per-
capita consumption is falling at some point over the modelling horizon, conditional
on the schedule of emissions cuts pursued.
To begin with, we examine three such climate-change policies. They are, ﬁrst,
`business as usual', second, a schedule of emissions cuts to limit the atmospheric
concentration of CO2 to twice its pre-industrial level (560 parts per million, hereafter
referred to as the 2 CO2 policy), and, third, a more aggressive schedule of cuts to
limit the concentration of CO2 to only one-and-a-half times its pre-industrial level
(420ppm, hereafter referred to as the 1.5 CO2 policy). The latter two schedules, the
abatement schedules, have both been prominent in recent international negotiations
about climate policy. Figure 1 presents estimates of the probability that, for each
of these three policies, ct > ct+1 with respect to any two successive time periods
between 2005 and 2205. To generate these estimates, we take a Latin Hypercube
sample of the eight uncertain parameters in DICE, yielding 1000 random draws.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
8Using Nordhaus' (2008) standard values for DICE's variables and parameters.
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Figure 1 shows that the probability of falling consumption per capita is positive,
but small, under all three policies. Indeed, for the coming century, the probability
is virtually the same across the three policies, despite the very diﬀerent emissions
control rate under business as usual compared with those under the two abatement
policies. This is because, in a very small number of draws, climate damage is so
large as to drive consumption growth negative, irrespective of the emissions controls
put in place. We can see from Figure 1 that the probability of this is, for example,
0.002 in 2025.9 However, what Figure 1 clearly shows is the pay-oﬀ to abatement in
the 22nd century, when the probability of falling consumption increases signiﬁcantly
under business as usual, while remaining broadly steady under the 2 CO2 and 1.5
CO2 abatement policies.
4.1 Welfare evaluation of emissions cuts
Table 2 goes on to examine what these underlying estimates of consumption per
capita mean for SDU and DU welfare.
Before we explain the results, a few words are in order about our measure of
welfare changes. In computing social welfare according to SDU and DU, we obtain
the value of the two abatement policies compared with business as usual in terms
of social welfare, measured in utils. We need to express the change in social welfare
due to abatement in consumption-equivalent terms, in order to quantify willingness
to pay. However, matters are complicated by the very large changes in social welfare
we must contemplate as a result of the risk analysis (e.g. in a future contingency
where climate damage is severe under business as usual, but can largely be avoided
by abatement). We cannot simply normalise the change in social welfare using the
(inverse of the) marginal social welfare of a unit of consumption,10 because the
welfare change may not be marginal, so that the ﬁrst-order approximation of the
utility function may be poor (see also Dietz and Hepburn, 2010). Therefore we turn
to the concept of the stationary equivalent consumption, a concept which, following
Weitzman (1976), is a standard way of representing social welfare in dynamic settings
9In fact, Figure 1 shows that aggressive initial emissions abatement along the 1.5 CO2 policy path
actually makes matters worse for a time, as the high initial cost of abatement drives consumption
growth negative earlier than under the other two policies in one of the 1000 draws.
10Whereby 1
U′ ∆W is our welfare change measure in consumption-equivalent terms, where ∆W
is the change in social welfare according to either SDU or DU between one of the two abatement
policies on the one hand and business as usual on the other.
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Table 2. Change in expected stationary equivalent
of 2 CO2 and 1.5 CO2 policies compared with
business as usual, according to SDU and DU.
Abatement SDU DU
policy 5% Mean 95% 5% Mean 95%
2 CO2 -0.13 4.26 0.71 -0.13 0.16 0.55
1.5 CO2 -1.59 3.44 0.59 -1.60 -0.66 0.34
and which we have already discussed in Section 2.11
Table 2 displays our estimates of the stationary equivalent consumption of the
2 CO2 and 1.5 CO2 abatement policies, compared with business as usual, according
to both SDU and DU. We report the mean estimate, i.e. the expected change in
the stationary equivalent, and also indicate the nature of the underlying distribution
of the change in the stationary equivalent by reporting both the 5th and 95th per-
centiles. The utility discount rate ρ in these calculations is 0.02, thus the per-period
(i.e. decadal) discount factor is ∼0.82, and the coeﬃcient of relative inequality/risk
aversion is set to two. For these (and all subsequent) calculations, we use the full
modelling horizon from 2005 to 2395.
The table contains our core result, showing that willingness to pay for emissions
abatement is signiﬁcantly larger under SDU than under DU. For the 2 CO2 policy, the
expected increase in the stationary equivalent is 4.26% under SDU, nearly thirtyfold
higher than the corresponding estimate of 0.16% under DU. For the 1.5 CO2 policy,
the expected increase is 3.44% under SDU, but -0.66% under DU. Intriguingly, this
policy reduces social welfare according to DU, but according to SDU it increases it.
These results follow directly from the ﬁnding, detailed in Figure 1, that consumption
is more likely to fall under business as usual than under either of the two abatement
policies. SDU places greater value on these policies than DU as a consequence: they
are more likely to guarantee sustainability, deﬁned as non-decreasing wellbeing.
What Table 2 also shows is the inﬂuence of uncertainty, speciﬁcally the small
11We could instead have applied the balanced growth equivalent (BGE) introduced by Mirrlees
and Stern (1972). The BGE of a given amount of social welfare is the initial level of consumption
per capita, which, if it grows at a constant annual rate over all time, yields the same amount of
social welfare. However, as Anthoﬀ and Tol (2009) show, the stationary equivalent consumption
gives the same result as the BGE (independently of the choice of growth rate), provided the utility
function exhibits constant relative inequality/risk aversion.
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number of random draws in which climate damage is severe. This is evident in
comparing the expected change in the stationary equivalent with the 95th percentile
change under SDU. For both policies, the expected change is in fact greater than the
95th percentile, indicating that a few random draws (less than 5%) have a change
in the stationary equivalent so large as to drive the expectation above the 95th
percentile. This is one way of showing that concerns about intergenerational equity
and concerns about uncertainty are closely linked in the context of climate change.
Figure 2 explores the sensitivity of the expected change in the stationary equiva-
lent as estimated under both SDU and DU to ρ. We examine values for ρ ∈ (0, 0.05)
(corresponding to a range for the decadal discount factor of 10.62). It is evident
that, in line with the distribution of near-term abatement costs and longer-term ben-
eﬁts, the expected change in the stationary equivalent of the two abatement policies
is a decreasing function of ρ, both under SDU and under DU. Indeed, it falls rapidly
as ρ is initially increased from 0.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
However, what is more interesting is that the expected change in the stationary
equivalent under SDU holds up to a greater extent than under DU, so that the dif-
ference between the two evaluation principles grows. When ρ = 0, the two principles
yield an identical evaluation. The reason for this can readily be seen by comparing
(w.1) and (W.1) in Section 2: when the discount factor approaches unity, the SDU
algorithm approaches the DU algorithm.12 However, as ρ increases, the two algo-
rithms can yield diﬀerent results depending on the probability of falling consumption
per capita, and Figure 2 bears this out. For both policies, the expected change in the
stationary equivalent falls and eventually becomes negative under DU, but remains
positive under SDU. As ρ rises, the far-oﬀ future matters less and less under DU,
and it is in the far-oﬀ future that the beneﬁts of abatement accrue. However, under
SDU the far-oﬀ future can continue to receive signiﬁcant weight, if at some point in
time future discounted utility is below present utility. We know from Figure 1 that
this is the case.
12In the limit, as ρ → 0, or equivalently, δ → 1, it follows from (w.1), (w.2), (W.1) and (W.2)
that DU and SDU welfare are determined only by the eventual constant part of 0c beyond T , where
ct = cT for all t ≥ T . Then both DU and SDU welfare become insensitive to present wellbeing, as
w(0c) = W (0c) = U(cT ), illustrating a problematic aspect of undiscounted utilitarianism.
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4.2 Optimal policies
Finally, rather than evaluating exogenous policy settings, it is informative to com-
pare the optimal schedule of emissions abatement under SDU and DU. To do this,
we set ρ = 0.02, and follow Nordhaus (2008) in simultaneously solving a schedule
of emissions control rates {µt} (where for each t, µt ∈ [0, 1]) that maximises the ex-
pectation of SDU and DU respectively. Thus the emissions control rate is a number
between 0 and 1, which controls the emissions intensity of output, and a control rate
of µt results in a fraction 1− µt of output contributing to emissions.
In an integrated assessment model such as DICE, and especially in running risk
analysis, solving this optimisation problem is a non-trivial computational challenge.
However, we are able to ﬁnd a solution using a genetic algorithm (Riskoptimizer)
and with two modiﬁcations to the basic optimisation problem.13 Figure 3 presents
the schedule of optimal emissions abatement corresponding to SDU and DU. It can
be seen, intuitively, that emissions abatement is at least as high under SDU as it is
under DU in every time period, and is considerably higher in some, speciﬁcally in the
latter half of this century and in the next (top panel). The bottom panel also brings
out the diﬀerences between the two sets of optimal controls, but it further shows
that, nevertheless, optimal annual emissions are increasing under SDU and DU for
at least the next one hundred years (albeit much less than under business as usual,
given the control rates). This is explained by our choice of ρ = 0.02, which favours
less aggressive strategies of emissions control, all else equal. Setting ρ closer to zero
would see the ﬂow of emissions peaking earlier, under DU and especially under SDU.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
13First, we only solve µt from 2005 to 2245 inclusive, rather than all the way out to 2395. This
considerably reduces the scope of the optimisation problem, in return for making little diﬀerence
to the results, since in the standard version of DICE µt = 1, t > 2245 (i.e. abatement yields
high beneﬁts relative to costs in the far-oﬀ future). Our own results also show that µt → 1 as
t → 2245. Second, we guide the optimisation by imposing the soft constraint that µt is non-
decreasing everywhere (via an exponential penalty function when µt decreases between any two
time periods). Otherwise, the algorithm struggled to ﬁnd a path towards the global maximum. As
a soft constraint, the penalty does not enter the welfare evaluation. We were able to verify that the
algorithm's best solution satisﬁed the property of non-decreasingness in µt, and that no solution
was found which returned higher SDU/DU, where µt was decreasing at any point.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have introduced sustainable discounted utilitarianism (SDU) as an
alternative criterion to discounted utilitarianism (DU) for the evaluation of climate-
abatement policies and we have conducted a risk analysis with the DICE integrated
assessment model in order to ﬁnd out how much the switch matters empirically. To
set the stage for this application, we ﬁrst extended the concept of SDU to variable
population and uncertainty (speciﬁcally risk). On the back of recent controversies, we
also adjusted the climate sensitivity and damage function used in the standard DICE
model, as part of our wider risk analysis. The result is that, with our alternative
speciﬁcations, there is a non-negligible probability that some generation is better oﬀ
than its descendants due to the impacts of climate change.
In expectations and at an aggregate level, integrated assessment models like
DICE assume that the future will be much better than the present, due largely
to the assumption of positive growth in total factor productivity. In our empirical
analysis we have exploited the possibility that in contingencies where the climate
sensitivity is large (so that the increase in atmospheric CO2 leads to a large rise in
temperature) and temperature rise leads to large damages, development of wellbeing
may not be monotonically increasing. When such circumstances are assigned positive
probability, SDU more than DU promotes present action against climate change,
as our analysis has shown. Hence, moving from DU to SDU matters empirically.
Furthermore, this result is robust in the sense that the diﬀerence between DU and
SDU remains substantial even if a high discount rate is applied (we looked at rates
up to 5% per annum).
This last observation is particularly signiﬁcant. In the introduction, we found
ourselves agreeing with the arguments of Arrow, Dasgupta, Rawls and others that
the use in climate-policy evaluation of undiscounted utilitarianism, or similarly the
use of DU with a near-zero discount rate, leads to unappealing transfers of wealth
from the present to the future, when applied consistently across the wider set of
investment opportunities. Our analysis shows that concern for the wellbeing of future
generations might be better taken into account using SDU with a positive discount
rate substantially away from zero. What precisely that rate should be, when used
alongside SDU, ought to be the focus of a renewed discussion, which is beyond the
scope of this paper. In any case, we have shown that, within a relatively broad range,
tough emissions abatement schedules will continue to increase social welfare.
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At a spatially disaggregated level, climate change may lead to reduced wellbeing
(also when compared to present wellbeing) for certain groups, but not for others.
Provided that large-scale compensation schemes will not be undertaken, this applies
in particular to those living in geographical areas where climate change is likely to
be especially severe, and/or where vulnerability is particularly high. One example is
likely to be marginal agricultural regions in Africa, another low-lying coastal com-
munities in South and Southeast Asia. At such a disaggregated level, it will matter
much more to apply SDU instead of DU, as SDU in eﬀect does not discount the
utility loss due to climate change for those groups that are so severely aﬀected.
Therefore, it will be of great interest to apply the SDU criterion (or a similar
criterion  extended rank-discounted utilitarianism  proposed by Zuber and Asheim,
2010) for evaluating climate change in models where eﬀects are disaggregated on
groups, and compare DU to alternative criteria in such a setting. We will turn to
this in future work. However, even the present analysis is strongly indicative of the
importance of broadening the basis of climate-policy evaluation from DU to SDU
and beyond.
Finally, we should comment on the prospect that SDU might actually be applied
in policy-making. SDU is the outcome of an explicitly ethical approach to policy
evaluation (and within that, an axiomatic approach). As such, one is challenged
to adopt an impartial perspective on questions of intergenerational distribution. In
reality of course, the present generation  seen as one of a series of non-overlapping
generations  enjoys the autonomy to make its own decisions, and the incentive
to behave self-interestedly is strong. From a positive point of view, undiscounted
utilitarianism can be criticised for this reason: there is plenty of evidence to show
that the utility of future generations is discounted at some substantially positive rate,
despite ethical objections. However, our conviction is that the case for DU depends
in large part on the assumption that the future will be better oﬀ than the present
for certain, such that if the present generation believed its decisions could leave the
future worse oﬀ than it, it could be persuaded to revise those decisions. Hence
we do believe that the criterion of SDU might inﬂuence the present generation in its
evaluation of climate policies, and other policies where the sustainability of wellbeing
is under threat.
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Figure 1: Probability of falling consumption per capita for three emissions abatement
policies (business as usual, 2 CO2 and 1.5 CO2).
24
-0.50
0.50
1.50
2.50
3.50
4.50
5.50
6.50
7.50
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Utility discount rate (%)
E x
p e
c t
e d
 
c h
a n
g e
 
i n
 
s t
a t
i o
n
a r
y  
e q
u
i v
a l
e n
t  c
o
n
s u
m
p t
i o
n
 
( %
)
SDU
DU
112.38
0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Utility discount rate (%)
E x
p e
c t
e d
 
c h
a n
g e
 
i n
 
s t
a t
i o
n
a r
y  
e q
u
i v
a l
e n
t  c
o
n
s u
m
p t
i o
n
 
( %
)
SDU
DU
35.70
Figure 2: Expected change in stationary equivalent consumption per capita under
SDU and DU as a function of the utility discount rate, for the 2 CO2 (top) and 1.5
CO2 (bottom) policies.
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Figure 3: Optimal emissions under SDU and DU in terms of (top) the emissions
control rate and (bottom) annual industrial CO2 emissions.
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